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Abstract. Auctions purchases represent an effective mechanism for 
public authorities, designed to provide the buyer (public authority), 
products and services with a convenient time to complete the transaction 
and the option to set a minimum price. In this paper we will study the 
problem of the optimal public expenditure rules using Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium in an symmetrical auction with knowledge of independent 
value, meaning  each bidder knows only his own information. After 
setting the function for optimum balance to profit for the bidders by 
minimizing this function (the derivation of I order) and maximize it (the 
derivation of II order), it has to identify the optimal range where the offer 
of a bidder  for products and services will stand. 
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1. Introduction 
The today science of public finance is required in our days, through its 
specialists to resolve many of the problems that the financial economy of any 
country has. Chronic budget deficits and public debt are just two examples of 
indicators which are taken under observation constantly by international 
financial institutions. Of course, to these indicators there are added others that 
are given by sciences like macroeconomics, namely: GDP, inflation rate, 
unemployment rate or monetary matters such as foreign exchange or interest 
rate. 
All these indicators provide financial institutions and central or local 
governments information about the evolution of the financial health of the 
country in general. They are not only diagnostic indicators. They are also 
signaling indicators, under which certain measures to rationalize public 
spending or increase revenues to the public budget may be taken to mitigate the 
adverse effect of chronic budget deficits. 
The global economic crisis has led governments, for not getting out of 
control the excessive budget deficits, to intervene with crisis action plans, in 
hopes of identifying the necessary antidote to neutralize and remove the 
negative impact that the global economic crisis has had and has upon the 
economic development. 
What can the science of public finances do under these circumstances? Or 
what can the public finance specialists do to help reduce, if not remove, the 
negative impact of the global economic crisis that has spread with great 
intensity at all levels of economic and social life? 
The answer is difficult to formulate in only a few rows. This is because 
the science of public finances, as any science of complexity, is satisfying in this 
period a number of functions that do not remove the “template” of a scientific 
science. On the contrary, the science of public finances, thus strengthening its 
credibility in the face of those who believed the power of information and 
decision impaired by frequent university essays from pulpits, they have no 
immediate applicability, even practical. 
We say, without fear of being wrong, that the first service of the public 
finances science is the information. This is because the science of public 
finance has a tool that large corporations seem to use it more and more, known 
for specialists as “budget execution account”. An attempt to define it, beyond 
the scientific rigor required of specialists in the field, would lead us to the idea 
that the budget execution account is the mirror image of fiscal discipline 
imposed by budgetary appropriations, but also a way of measuring the degree 
of collection of funds. The game of financial resources dynamics, combined Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management 
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with budgetary discipline imposed by the rules given by the budgetary credits 
offer, in the end, budgetary excess or deficit, which can often be dangerous. 
Beyond the figures recorded in the statement of budget execution, sometimes 
hard to decipher, is the financial dimension of budgetary resources by the 
classic and modern rules used in estimating budgets. Specialists using these 
method lead ultimately to the development of another document of financial 
summary, known as the budget of income and expenditure. 
A second function of the science of public finances in a period of global 
economic crisis is the signaling, in general, a very important role in preventing 
risks. It's like a driver without signaling, runs the risk of injury, which can have 
a fatal impact on it. The science of public finances, in a coded language, can 
indicate such risks, even in real time, to avoid financial collapse, state that may 
intervene in the management of public resources. This is because information 
from the budget of income and expenses are translated into the budgetary 
execution account, whose harsh rules of are to be followed almost daily by 
specialists in the field. What information does the budgetary execution account 
provide us? It is a first category of information related to public expenditure. 
We can use the financial resources to finance expenditure than within the 
approved budget appropriations. And we all know this. A simple rule that 
signals when certain categories of public spending have exhausted the funds 
approved. A second category of information concerns government revenue. All 
financial resources budgeted in the form of taxes, coded with indicators of 
budgetary classification, are followed up after their receipt by determining the 
degree of collection. So we will identify the areas of budgetary execution 
account which surplus of the collections, marking them as areas with (+) or the 
same account areas of budget execution are with deficit, marking them as areas 
with (–).  The frequency of areas with (+) and areas with (–) can be the signal of 
a cash deficit for which preventive measures should be taken immediately by 
those responsible (Boloş, 2002, p. 284). 
A third function of public finance science is to rationalize public 
spending. Usually in times of economic crisis there are constraints imposed to 
operational expenditures. Wage reductions or reductions in operating costs are 
famous examples in this regard. Protected in times of crisis are capital 
expenditures. By increasing their attempts to send a pulse in the economy, 
hoping that the engine will restart the stopped economies, fueled with public 
investments. 
Finally the last service of the public finance science is the function of 
fiscal rigor. Are the public finances able to provide models for calculating taxes 
and duties to meet the requirements of fairness and rational tax bases for 
taxation? An answer difficult and quite complicated. This is because not anyone Petru Filip, Marcel Ioan Boloş, Cristian Ioan Otgon  
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is able to generate principles of taxation on ficality, when the number of 
taxpayers exceeds hundreds of thousands or even millions of taxpayers. Either 
tax equity requirements and imposing rational can not be neglected. In lieu of 
taxes or tax increases is preferred a measure, also with fiscal origins, leading to 
an increased tax base or, why not, to diminish the phenomenon of tax evasion. 
But all these are measures to be extremely well planned, so as not to disturb the 
natural course of the economy. Or not to transform a tax measure in a measure 
of negative impact on national economies. 
All four of these functions, which are not limited to, can transform the 
science of public finances, not necessarily overnight, into a useful tool, invested 
with credibility, to base decisions in the public sector. 
2. Auction theory – step prior to the introduction of game theory in public 
finances 
Why are auctions important for the theory of public finances and why 
acutions represent the prior step to the introduction of game theory in the 
science of public finances. The answer to this questions is not simple. 
First of all we have to clarify the link between public finances and the 
theory of auctions. To understand this link we need to identify the impact they 
have on the management of livestock auctions in public financial resources 
sector. 
It is already known that through auctions are purchased goods and 
services required for the functioning of public authorities and services. 
Auctions, throughout the Community, is the generic name that is assigned to the 
procurement procedures, represented by direct purchase, direct negotiation, 
request for bids and the actual auctions, through which goods are procured in 
the public sector. 
For the science of public finance, auctions is the key element through 
which is formed the value of public assets to be acquired. And this value is the 
result of competition between suppliers of goods and services, which intends to 
provide public assets, at the lowest price and best quality. 
Auction rules are established by public authorities, which set the values of 
public assets that are expected to purchase  ) ( est V . These estimated values of 
public assets are seen as the market values or fair values, that values that will be 
allowed by the public authority. Over any of these estimated values, the bidders 
can not deliver the goods and services in the auction organized. 
Hence the first rule of auctions, namely that the values of goods and 
services provided for the needs of public authorities, can not exceed their 
estimated value. Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management 
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At the same time, each of the bidders participating in the auction have a 
specific cost  ) ( ef C  that is determined by direct and indirect costs of goods and 
service providers have. None of the bidders who comply with legitimate rules 
of operation on the market will not make a bid  ) ( ofi V  that is lower than its 
actual cost  ). ( ef C  
In these circumstances the second condition is formed, that is 
characteristic for the behavior of the suppliers of goods and services market, 
namely that the amount of assets is greater than or equal to the cost of each of 
the bidders. 
The conclusion is that any of the bidders will have a value of its offer 
) ( ofi V  that is lower or at most equal to the estimated value  ) ( est V , which in turn 
is greater than or equal to the cost of each of the bidders  ) ( ef C  after a 
relationship of the form:  . efi ofi est C V V ≥ ≥  
These are financial rules that follow the rules of economic efficiency for 
each of the two parties: the public authority and the provider of goods and 
services. These rules are added, practical and specific tenders held by public 
authorities and certain eligibility criteria and criteria for awarding tenders. 
The eligibility criteria for public authorities is a safety feature, because 
with this organization of the auction bidders that not have the technical and 
financial capacity to deliver goods or complex cases will not show up such as 
auctions to make the public investment. Criteria, although they are quite diverse 
in practice, require a certain financial level for bidders, performance but also 
some equipment carrying. The combination of financial and technical criteria 
make it possible to prevent specific risks of high complexity public investment 
(highways, airports, etc.). 
Criteria for the award of tenders are rules established and known by the 
participants in the auction before the organization. Such criterias, although very 
diverse in practice, are enabling the optimal combination between the price of 
public assets that are to be provided and quality. Any successful bid that meets 
the criteria for the award is declared the winner. 
Therefore any auction of public assets must abide by the rules of 
economic efficiency, legitimate of public authority and the bidder that when 
tendering to the conditions imposed by the eligibility criteria and the criteria for 
the award of tenders for an offer to be declared the winner. 
Why science is important for public finances auctions? It is easy to see 
how the value of public assets is formed is in the bidding process. The value of 
any offer is merely a confirmation that the asset values are formed in the public 
bidding process. Petru Filip, Marcel Ioan Boloş, Cristian Ioan Otgon  
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But between the amount bid and the terms that are used in the science of 
public finances is a direct link. This connection is made through budget 
appropriations. The value of public assets acquired may be greater than the 
approved budget appropriations. The rule is compulsory for most public assets 
that the public authorities acquire. The exception is public investment, for 
which a solution was multi-annual budget appropriations. 
So auctions are those that generate competition among bidders of public 
assets. Auction rules are established by public authority, which sets the estimated 
value, eligibility criteria and the criteria for awarding tenders. Estimated value is 
often, market value, which the public authority considers it can pay for goods and 
services that are expected to be delivered. No bidder may bid values are over the 
estimated value. Estimated value in turn can not be higher than the approved 
budget appropriations. This rules of the game but also the created competition 
among bidders, are leading eventually to the purchase of public assets whose value 
is between the estimated and the specific cost of each bidder. 
Auction theory is quite old. Pioneering work in the theory of auctions was 
written by Vickery, in 1960. Currently there are a number of five types of auctions 
that international practiced whose characteristics are presented in the table below: 
 
Table 1  
Types of auctions and their rules  
Tipe of auction  Rules of the auction 
English auction 
 
The auction price starts at safety, starting at a low price. Tenders increase 
sequentially, with a growth step, the winner being the highest price. 
Players can adjust their offer made during the auction. 
Dutch  auction  The auction starts at a high price, after which the price is gradually 
reduced until the first offer is made. This type of auction is frequently 
applied to exchanges with flowers. 
First price auction  This type of auction is characterized by the fact that the bid is submitted in 
a sealed envelope. Bidders do not know what do other bidders offer. It is 
declared winner if its offer is the highest price. If it comes to buying a 
property is the winning bid with the lowest price. 
Vickery auction   It is characterized by the fact that each bidder submitted its bid in a sealed 
envelope, containing a maximum and a minimum amount. None of the 
bidders do not know about other offer. Successful bidder pays the second 
sum in decreasing order. 
Japanese auction  The auction is characterized by the fact that it starts at a reserve price, 
then just as the English auction, the price increases sequentially. The 
difference between the two types of auction is that bidders for the tender 
must remain at the price bid for each auction closes when the competition 
has remained a single bidder 
Source: processed after Stelian Stancu, Nora Mihail (2007), Metode  şi tehnici de conducere. 
Teorie şi aplicaţii, Editura Economică, Bucureşti. 
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Auctions, regardless of type, is for the science of public finance a topic of 
debate among experts from at least two reasons: first, that the auctions, which 
are generated by the competitions we enter the exciting world of game theory, 
and the second is that through their form value of public assets represent a 
crucial step to engage in public spending. 
3. Game theory. Description of the games with incomplete information. 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in public finances science 
In many cases economically important, the game can begin with the 
player that has some private information about something relevant to his 
decisions. These are called games with incomplete information, or Bayesian 
games (Incomplete information should not be confused with imperfect 
information in which players do not observe perfectly the actions of other 
players). 
Although no player knows the private information of an opponent, he will 
have some beliefs about what the opponent knows, and we assume that these 
beliefs are common assumptions. 
In many situations of interest, we will be able to model information 
asymmetry by specifying for each player position for their own gain, but each 
player is not sure what their opponents gain functions are. 
We use the term “type” of a player to describe his private information. 
The type fully describe for a player any information that is not public 
information. Each player knows his own type with complete confidence. His 
beliefs about other players are comprised of one common level of knowledge 
about the probability distribution over others' “types”.  
We can imagine a game as starting with a random motion, which assigns 
each player a specific type. This movement is imperfectly observed, however 
each player type information indicates that the movement has marked on it, but 
no player has direct knowledge of the type awarded to any other player. We can 
think of as game as a strategic game being played by a single type of each 
player, provided that at least one player does not know what type is assigned to 
another player he faced. The notion of “type” indicates the private information 
that a player holds. 
A strategy for a player in the game with incomplete information is one 
strategy for each of them by that player to formulate a strategic game, with that 
form. 
A Bayesian equilibrium in a static game with incomplete information is a 
strategy profile, so that each type of each player seeks to maximize expected Petru Filip, Marcel Ioan Boloş, Cristian Ioan Otgon  
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utility, given the strategies of his opponents and the type of probability 
distributions for the types of each player. 
Information asymmetry and, in particular, playing with incomplete 
information are extremely important in game theory. This is especially true for 
dynamic games in which players have more decisions to make in a row. Their 
previous moves may send private information that are relevant to the decisions 
of later moving players. Revealing and concealing information are the basis for 
much of the analysis of strategic behavior and are especially useful as a means 
to explain the irrational actions that could become part of a nonstrategic world. 
A second approach to the game with asymmetric information has been 
brought by the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and provides a game that 
starts prior convictions common to all players, which specifies the probability 
that random movement of players to assign types beginning of the game. Some 
players see movement and update their beliefs, while other players can update 
their beliefs only through deductions during the follow-up action game for the 
players that already know. 
We analyze in this paper the optimum problem (maximizing profits) in an 
auction in which the symmetrical independent value is known, meaning each 
bidder knows only his own information. After the vendor, which has an 
indivisible object, announces his bidding mechanism, independent bidders 
decide whether to participate in it or not. Bidders know their assessments before 
deciding on the amount to bid. But the particularity of the work is the fact that 
we track the sellers interest, which in our case is the public authority that 
auctions the purchase of a public good, so it is going to incur costs, and its 
interest is to make it at the smallest price. 
4. Assumptions of the dynamic game with incomplete information  
in auctions of public assets 
We show that the optimal outcome of a tender offer shall not involve 
stochastic bidding. Each bidder will participate in the auction if his assessment 
on the cost implications may provide a profit margin. Given an arbitrary 
distribution of such profit margins depending on the characteristics of bidders, 
the optimal rule is a known one: the bidder with the higher (or lower, depending 
on the nature of the tender) evaluation from the participants will be the winner. 
So the problem of the auctioneer (seller) is reduced to finding the optimal level 
for reducing the margin by the bidders. 
Consider a symmetric independent private value framework. There is a 
seller (public authorities) characterized by risk-neutral, whom wants to 
conclude a contract for the purchase of a public good, indivisible, his Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management 
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assessment for the good being estimated V (Vest). There are n ≥ 2 potential 
risk-neutral buyers (bidders). May Cefi be a vector representing the actual costs 
of the tenderers on their assessments, with i Є {1, ..., n}. Bidders have 
independent evaluations, distributed according to the distribution function         
F(x), a positive density continuos function. Bidders know only their 
evaluations. The problem is that the seller should choose an auction mechanism 
that maximizes her expected profit in one of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium 
points (Milgrom, Weber, 1982, p. 114). 
A few remarks are needed here. In our analysis we exclude the agent-
agent communication. It is noted that the lack of communication between 
agents is a sufficient condition for our hypothesis that bidders in the auction 
behave noncooperative, which is a standard assumption in the optimal auctions 
literature. 
We consider any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of any auction where the seller 
can choose. Since the bidder is characterized as risk-neutral, he cares only to his 
expected probability to win the bid, denoted by Fi (being a function uniformly 
distributed on the interval [0,1]) and its expected cost, denoted Cefi. The 
expected equilibrium from an offer Vofi can be written as follows: 
 
, (1) 
where B(Cefi)=Vofi .    
 
In relation (1), if we replace the probability function with the uniformly 
distributed probability density function  , we obtain the players profit 
function with normally distributed probabilities between the two limits, Vest - 
upper limit and  Cefi - lower limit. 
 
        ( 2 )  
 
Since in the game situation with the proposed auction, a player's 
probability of winning increases as its offer is reduced, the distribution function 
in our case will be written as the difference between the upper limit on the 
amount estimated by the public authority and the player’s offer value (the blue 
part in the graph), reported to the difference between the two limits. Thus, the 
graph in Figure 1 presents the evolution of both the amount of profit a player 
obtains, Vofi - Cefi, the portion below the axis of the offer, and the probability of 
winning the bid to Vofi, on the portion above the axis. 
 Petru Filip, Marcel Ioan Boloş, Cristian Ioan Otgon  
 
86 
 
Source: own approach. 
 
Figure 1. The profits of a player in the game with the proposed tender 
 
To determine the expected profit of the bidders, but also to reach for the 
optimum function for the public authority, we determine first and second order 
derivative of profit function written in (2) (Bulow, Klemperer, 1996, p. 54). 
Thus, the first-order derivation of the profit function we get: 
 
δΠi/δVofi  x +(Vofi - Cefi) x   
 
δΠi/δVofi= +(Vofi - Cefi) x ]  
 
δΠi/δVofi= [  +(Vofi - Cefi) x ] 
 
In a Bayesian game, the player’s potential supply will certainly be less 
than the value estimated by the public authority, we consider   
different from 0, removing it from δΠi/δVofi=0. The maximization of a function 
by first-order derivation involves equating to zero. 
 
δΠi/δVofi=   +(Vofi - Cefi) x  =0 
 
δΠi/δVofi= Vest -Vofi -(Vofi - Cefi) x(n-1) =0 
 
Vofi =           ( 3 )  
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The offer value from equation (3) is the value, depending on its effective 
cost, for a player where it minimizes its profit function with the highest 
probability of winning that competition, when n players are competing in the 
auction. 
But not always the players will bid the offer with the highest probability 
of winning, sometimes taking a risk by choosing to have a greater profit with 
less chance of winning (Matthews, 1987, p. 128). Therefore for the second 
order derivation of the profit function we get a value for which the offer is made 
to maximize its profit function, reducing the corresponding probability of 
winning. 
 
δ
2Πi/δ
2Vofi= [  ] + 
[ ]  
 
δ
2Πi/δ
2Vofi= [  ] + 
[ ] 
 
δ
2Πi/δ
2Vofi= [  x  + 
( ) 
 
δ
2Πi/δ
2Vofi=  x(-n+2)-  =0 
 
- =0 
 
Vofi(n-2+(n-1)x(n-2)+n) + Vest(-n+2-n)-Cefi x(n-1)x(n-2)=0 
 
Vofi=  
 
Vofi=           ( 4 )  
 
Thus from relations (3) and (4) we obtained two limits for the bidders 
offer, which can be determined by each player depending on the value 
estimated by the public authority, its effective cost and the number of players in 
the auction. When an auction with the terms of the proposed game, the public 
can create a “channel” of each player's bids, within which it follows to choose 
which offer to tender. Petru Filip, Marcel Ioan Boloş, Cristian Ioan Otgon  
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Source: own approach 
 
Figure 2. Optimal auction channel, formed by the optimization  public authority – bidder relationship 
 
In a series of simulations carried out by generating the channel, which 
took into account individual and simultaneous change in the estimated value, 
effective cost and the number of players, we could see a number of conclusions 
relevant and useful to the public authority. 
In figure 2, the simulation has as input information, a constant estimated 
value and a constant actual cost and the increase in the number of players. The 
conclusion that can be observed is that as the number of players increases, the 
player is forced to reduce it’s bided amount, the auction channel thus narrows, 
but also closes to the actual cost value of the player. This means that an increase 
in the number of players in a bid determines any player to cut its bidded value, 
fact that benefits the public authority, leading to the idea of accepting in public 
auctions a larger number of bidders. 
 
Figure 3. Simulation game: the actual cost kept constant, number of players constant,  
the estimated value changed Source: own approach Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management 
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Figure 3 is playing back a simulation where a total of 10 players, and the 
effective cost is kept constant, the estimated value is changed. As the estimated 
value established by the public is a big difference to the lower limit given by 
the actual cost, the offer channel of the auction widens and the bidder will have 
a greater range from which to choose what offer value will bid. On the left side 
of the graph, where the estimated value is reduced, the range is narrower, and 
the auction channel is closer to the actual cost of the players. 
 
Table 2 
Simulation game by changing the bidding variables 
N 10 15  20  25  30  35 40  45 
Cefi  20  20  20 20 20  20  20  20 
Vest  100 90  80 70 60  50  40  30 
Vofi  min.  28  24.66667  23 22 21.33333  20.85714  20.5  20.22222 
Vofi  max.  36  29.33333  26 24 22.66667  21.71429  21  20.44444 
 
 
Source: own approach. 
 
Figure 4. Simulation - increase the number of players,  
with concomitant reduction of the estimated value 
 
5. Conclusions and proposals 
 
Following the above two simulations generated by increasing the number 
of players and decreasing the estimated value, we can conclude that this favors 
the approach of the tendered value to the actual cost of the player, as shown in 
Figure 4. Thus, the auction channel becomes increasingly narrow and closer to 
the actual cost of the player's value, reaching nearly to coincide with this value. 
Basically these two conditions, the increase of the number of players at the 
same time with establishing an estimated value closer to the actual cost of the 
potential winner, not restricting the entry of other players in the game, are two Petru Filip, Marcel Ioan Boloş, Cristian Ioan Otgon  
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objectives that public authorities should consider them a priority in organizing 
an auction of a public expenditure commitment. 
It is obvious that these proposed findings fit in a game where there is no 
transmission of information. This is one of the main limits of the model, but to 
some extent they are reflected in an asymmetric information game. Another 
limit that we try to adjust in future research is the character of neutral-risk 
players, but also the little amount of variables taken into consideration in 
calculating the amount of players offer. 
Game theory provides a broad framework for further research on many 
economic issues, including financial resources and improving management of 
public authorities in tendering for public goods. This area of research has a 
direct impact on the public budget. Identification of an optimal auction model 
or draw conclusions relevant to this form of signing contracts of public 
spending should be a priority for every public authority, in order to make 
management more efficient and fair for public funds. 
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